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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN MAJOR ORCHESTRAS
By Arthur S. Leonard
Although collective bargaining has existed among major orches-
tras in the United States since the turn of the century, its power-
ful role as a primary determinant of wages, hours, and working
conditions for classical musicians had not been fully realized un-
til the latter part of the 1960s. Consequently, a wealth of quantita-
tive data had failed to warrant rigorous analysib until Leon Lunden
had undertaken and completed a survey of labor relations among
major symphony orchestras in 1967. The present work is an attempt
to expand upon the framework developed by Lundev, particularly
in the recently emerging area ofstrike activity, and to update the
types of data which he compiled. While the fate of orchestra bar-
gaining is admittedly less than essential to the welfare of a commu-
nity, the author contends that the lessons derived from major or-
chestra experiences can be applied to discussions of other white
collar unions and professional employee organizations.
Whether dealing with the historical detting or his own data, the
author considers the major issues of collectie bargaining among
orchestras to be wages and length of seasons. Other important i-s-p
sues include conditions and wates for touring, length and number
of rehearsals, procedures for removing players, insurance, and
pensions. Newer issues involve seating rotation, moonlighting, and
splitting up the orchestra for special events. The author finds that
the greatest gains within the last decade fall within the areas of va-
cations, wages, and length of seasons, with significant gains also
noted with respect to pensions and hospital plans.
Turning to the issue of strike activity, the author notes substantial
increases in the number of strikes between the 1950s and 1960s with
sustained increases throughout the 1970s. Wages and length of sea-
sons continue to be the most controversial issues. Non-monetary
questions of social status and the psychological impact of ego depri-
vation among more obscure artists have also been contributory fac-
tors. Although his data is not entirely conclusive, the author forwards
a pattern bargaining theory in which striking orchestras break new -
ground and non-strikers stand to gain larger increases in the follow-
ing round. The study concludes with an analytical synthesis of con-
tractual language peculiar to orchestra agreements.
Arthur Leonard, a graduate of the New York State School of Industrial
and Labor Relations at Cornell University, is a student at the Harvard
Law School.
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INTRODUCTION
Major symphony orchestras provide an interesting collective bargaining
setting. The workers are white-collar professionals, most with college
training, who have engaged in collective bargaining since the turn of the
centuryl - -a rarity in the United States. The orchestra is a nonprofit or-
ganization, usually run at a loss, which can always make ability-to-pay
agruments with sincerity. 2 The musicians are a distinct minority in both
their local unions and the American Federation of Musicians. 3 Because
classical music is not a necessary commodity for the survival of a met-
ropolitan area, the labor relations of the orchestra are usually free of .
some of the pressures involved in disputes affecting the general welfare
of the public. Thus, collective bargaining in symphony orchestras pre-
sents an interesting case study of many hypotheses advanced in the liter-
ature about industrial relations. The case can provide data on what to
expect as more white-collar and semi-professional employees, inclu-
ding teachers, doctors, lawyers and social workers become involved in
collective bargaining, particularly through their involvement in public
sector unionism.
This study relies on two mAjor sources of information. Secondary sources
and previous academic sources provide in formation on the history of bar-
gaining in orchestras and the development of terms and conditions of em-
ployment over the years. The author's own survey of major orchestras
provides data on the current situati6n and the strike history of the past
decade.
PART I: THE SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The Symphony Orchestra: What It. Is
The symphony orchestra as a cultural institution dates to the late 18th
century. Orchestras of the period were frequently of the pick-up var-
iety, with an impresario engaging artists of known talentto form an-en-
semble for a given concert program or series. Some relatively per-
manent orchestras were maintained by wealthy royalty, some ensembles
were supported by church funds, and some opera orchestras were state-
supported. In.Europe, the orchestra grew niainly as a state-subsidiied
organism, and even today some of the major orchestras of Europe are
affiliated with state-owned opera houses (the Vienna Philharmonic, for ex-
ample) or state-operated broadcast media (the French National Radio and
Television Orchestra). Of course, all the orchestras in socialist and com-
munist states are state-operated. During the 19th and 20th centuries,
some enterprising conductors, such as Pasdeloup, Colonne, and'Halle,
formed their own orchestras, which still exist today. Also, .sach or-
chestras as the London Symphony and the New Philharmonic of London
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were formed by orchestral musicians as self -goverqing organizations.
In America, many of the earliest orchestras after the initial pick-up stage
were those formed by individual conductors, such as Theodore Thomas
and Leopold Damrosch. 4 These were frequently touring ensembles which
operated out of an Eastern city but spent much of their time traveling to
other major cities to perform concert series. Some permanent orchestras
were founded in major cities during the 19th century, such as the New
York Philharmonic, the Boston Symphony, and the Cincinnati Symphony. 5
Sometimes the impetus for-formation of an orchestra came from a wealthy
music-lover, sometimes from an organization (usually of wealthy women)
looking for a cultural project, 6 and sometimes from the efforts of musi-
cians themselves. 7 Most of America's major symphony orchestras were
founded in the first twenty-five years of the 20th century, although some
of the most recent additions to the ranks of the majors are newer ensembles.
The major symphony orchestra today is an ensemble of from 50 to 105
musicians, all members of the local union in the city where they are em-
ployed. There is usually a personnel manager, a general manager (who
most often conducts labor negotiations), and a board of directors. 8 The
principal conductor, in some cities titled the Musical Director, is most
often a part-time fixture these days, at least among the so-called "prin-
cipal majors" as the demands of a modern international conducting and
recording career remove "celebrity" conductors from their own orches-
tras for a substantial portion of each season. 9 Although some orchestras
own their own halls, others must bear the costs of rental for each concert,
'either in a civic auditorium or a privately-operated hall. Most of the ex-
pense in running an orchestra, howeter, is attributable to labor costs. 10
Collective bargaining takes place on an orchestra by orchestra basis, al-
though there- is consultation on both sides of the table.
Symphony Orchestra Finance
The performance of symphonic music is not a profit-making proposition.
Virtually all major orchestras today experience the phenomenon of the
euphemistically entitled "Income Gap" -- in reality, a deficit operation.
Between salary commitments; and the overhead costs of operation as
against the demand for concert tickets, orchestras do not normally produce
enough revenue through ticket sales and records to cover their budgets.
In fact, every concert, even if it sells out, is a money-losing event for
the typical major orchestra. 11
Consequently, the major symphony orchestra is constantly on the lookout
for non-performance-related funds. Some city or state governments give
outright appropriations to the local orchestra to aid in closing the Income
Gap, since the presence of a major symphony is a source of prestige to
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a community. Others appropriate funds for special events, such as the
celebrated Central Park free concerts by the New York Philharmonic
or the Cincinnati Symphony's extensive public school concert program
in southern Ohio. State Councils on the Arts appropriate funds for opea-
tions, special events, and commissions of new music from state residents.
The Federal Government's National Endowment for the Arts provides
grants to be matched by local fund-raising efforts, as have some private
foundations, such as the Ford Foundation. Boards of directors of or-
chestras, composed mainly of the wealthy and socially-prestigious mem-
bers of the community, are the major coordinators of fund-raising
efforts. "Save the Orchestra" campaigns arise in many cities with great
publicity whenever the Income Gap looms too large. Some cities have
tried other innovative fund-raising efforts, such as benefit games by pro-
fessional athletic teams, shopping center concerts at which donations are
solicited, and even street-corner solicitation of funds by roving musicians
in one city where the orchestra was threatened by extinction. 12
Despite the aura of financial well-being projected by an ensemble of 95
tuxedoed individuals playing in perfect harmony, some orchestras have
been faced by severe survival problems when the Income Gap could not
be closed. The New Jersey Symphony, for example, has had to reduce
its season and cut pay for its musicians. 13 The Dallas Symphony sus-
pended operations entirely part way through the 1973-1974 season be-
cause it had not the cash on hand to continue paying its musicians. 14 The
American Symphony Orchestra was virtually disbanded by its board when
Leopold Stokowski, its prestigious and income-attracting founder/con-
ductor, retired to England. (This last-case has had a happy ending, for
the members of the orchestra have-reorganized as the first modern co-
operative metropolitan orchestra in America and appear to be reasonably
successful in their maiden season. )15
Clearly, the financial problems of the orchestra will have a major bearing
on its labor relations policy. At the same time, the scarcity of employ-
ment for classically trained musicians (there are only thirty orchestras
in the country where the annual minimum negotiated salary is above the
poverty line!) brings pressure on the musiciaiis union to take into account
the problems of the orchestra association when it enters into bargaining. 16
The local union bargaining with the New Jersey Symphony acquiesced in a
reduction of contract terms in order to keep the orchestra alive. 17 The
local union in Salt Lake City has foregone many of the gains won by unions
against orchestras of comparable reputation in Cincinnati and Houston in
order to avoid killing the orchestra. 18 This listing is not exhaustive,
merely illustrative. But it demonstrates that the locals and orchestra
managements in many cities have more goals in common than might be the
case in most labor-management relations.
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Major Symphony Orchestras of the United States
The Los Angeles Philharmonic*
The San Diego Symphony Orchestra*
The San Francisco Symphony Orchestra*
The Denver Symphony Orchestra*
The Washington National Symphony Orchestra*
The Greater Miami Philharmonic
The Atlanta Symphony Orchestra*
The Honolulu Symphony Orchestra*
The Chicago Symphony Orchestra*
The Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra*
The New Orleans Philharmonic-Symphony Orchestra*
The Baltimore Symphony Orchestra*
The Boston Symphony Orchestra*
The Detroit'Symphony Orchestra
The Minnesota Orchestra*
The Kansas City Philharmonic*
The Saint Louis Symphony Orchestra*
The New Jersey Symphony Orchestra"
The Buffalo Philharmonic Orchestra
The New York Philharmonic-Sympony Orchestra*
The Rochester Philharmonic Orchestra*
The Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra*
The Cleveland Orchestra*
The Philadelphia Orchestra*
The Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra*
The Dallas Symphony Orchestra
The Houston Symphony Orchestra*
The San Antonio Symphony Orchestra*
The Utah Symphony Orichestra*
The Seattle Symphony Orchestra*
The Milwaukee Symphony Orchestra*
* Survey Participants either through management response, union response,
or both. Data from other sources was obtained About the Detroit Symphony
and the New Jersey Symphony.
The American Symphony Orchestra League classifies orchestras on the basis
of their annual budget. The major orchestras all spend more than $1 million
each year.
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The Labor Side of the Table
Virtually all major orchestras in the United States, with the exception
of the Boston Symphony Orchetara, have been fully unionized since about
the turn of the century or the time of their founding. 20 In many cities, the
local union wasa .major fox-ce in the creation of the orchestra. This was very
much the: case irL Cleveland. whexe the loc.,l: union did the it hiring and the
contracting for the. experimental concerts which led to the establishment of
a full-time orchestral ensemble in that city. ZI Houston's orchestra was
also founded with heavy union participation. 2Z The New York Philharmonic
was founded by musicians of that city, and only ceased being a cooperatively
run orchestra after the turn of the century, when management became so
complex that a professional staff and fund-raising board became necessary. 23
Declining employment for classically trained musicians has been a major
problem in this country. With the rise of talking motion pictures and Muzak
in public places, many traditional employment opportunities for musicians
were terminated. The symphony orchestra was frequently viewed by local
unions as a virtual charity oiganization for the employment of classical
musicians. Consequently, local unions in most cities were very protec-
tive of their orchestras, approaching collective bargaining in a spirit of
collaboration rather than confrontation. 24
This bargaining atmosphere was possible at least in part because symphony
musicians made up a distinct minority in local unions. 25 They almost
never were directly represented on negotiating committees, and had no
right to ratify collective bargaining agreements as a unit separate from
the local union. Thus, the majority of a local union, composed of non-
symphony musicians, dictated the terms and conditions under which the
minority- -symphony musicians--worked. Local union officials had a low
opinion of symphony musicians generally, as Lunden discovered when he
prepared his thesis on the subject:
To his union, the symphony musician presents a face
of ineptness in practical matters. One union official
described the player as a griper about a lot of petty
nonsense; another, as unrealistic and impractical, who,
if he negotiated for himself, would be playing for $5. 00
a night. A third union officer looked upon the symphony
instrumentalist as a "different breed', naive, easily mani-
pulated,: and no match for a.shrewd orchestra manager. A
fourth acknowledged that symphony players were talented
artists, but that they had no sense of responsibility, living
on Cloud Nine, and asking for pie in the sky. A fifth de-
scribed the player as well-educated, but with a feeling
that the world owed him a living. 26
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The sudden outbreak 'of player militance in the major orchestras during the
late 1950's and 1960's is not surprising when one considersthat this system
of bargaining and the concomitant attitudes of management prevailed in most
cities well into the 1960's. The results of such barggining Are easily imagined.
Only in the very top orchestras (not even all five of the traditional Big Five
of New York, Phildelphia, Boston, Chicago and Cleveland) could orchestra
players make a satisfactory minimum income from syrmphiny employment
ilone. 27 Short seasons, usually around 25 weeks, and low pay for- those
weeks, combined to make symphony playing a part-time job at best. In the
very top otphestra in 1959, the minimum salary was only $7000; 21 This is
an incredibly low amount, even for 1959, considering the prestige of the in-
stitution and the degree of training and preparation engaged in by musicians
before they could be employed by the ensemble. 29
By the late 1950's, symphony musicians in New York, Washington, and Phila-
delphia were expressing their discontent with the status quo. In New York,
Local 802 was embarassed bya dispute in which the orchestra members
went out on strike against boti management and the union 30 Local unions
responded to symphony player complaints in piecemeal fashion. The first
token reform allowed. symphony players to observe collective bargaining
sessions. The next step might allow them to take part in the actual bar-
gaining. From there, they won ratification rights. In some cities, orchestra
bargaining committees, elected by the symphony musicians, are now the sole
participants on the labor side of the table. However, the degree of reform
and evolution varies from city to city, so that there remain different degrees
of participation even today. In addition, the terms and conditions under which
symphony. muqicians are employed to make recordings are centrally negotiated
by the American Federation of Musicians and the recording industry at
national level, so that a major source of income in the principal orchestras
(and a minor-source in many of the others) is governed by an agreement con-
cluded extdrnally from the bargaining process of the individual orchestra. 31
As symphony players began to increase their participation in collective bar-
gaining, many of them felt the need for communication with members of other
orchestras. Early in the 1960's, a midwestern tour by the Philadelphia Or-
chestra led to the foundation of an organization for such cooperative endeavors.
Some Philadelphia players met informally with Chicago Symphony musicians
during their tour stop in that city and agreed that discussions on a wider
scale were merited. Notices were sent to the players in other major orches-
tras, and a convocation of representatives assembled in Chicago on the
occaision of the Philadelphia's next swing through the city the following
year. Soon, most of the major orchestras were participating, and the or-
ganization that resulted had acquired an acronym (ICSOM, for International
Conference of Symphony and Opera Musicians) and a fiery newslg tter,
"Senza Sordino" (which is the musical notation for "without mutes").
Various officials of the A. F. M. viewed the formation of ICSOM and its
militant pronouncements with alarm as a possible secession movement
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leading to dual unionism. After several conferences sponsored by the
A. F. M. on symphony problems had demonstrated the federation's in-
terest in keeping symphony musicians in the International, ISCOM was
absorbed as a Symphony Musicians'Conference in the A. F. M. in 1966,
and today.serves as a clearinghouse for information on collective bar-
gaining. 32
Collective bargaining in orchestras was a voluntary phenomenon until 1973.
The major orchestras of the country were all organizaed and the closed -
shop prevailed in orchestras as early as the turn of the century. When
the Wagner Act was passed, orchestras as non-profit orgainzations were
.technically included in its coverage, but the NLRB's policy of not ex-
erting jurisdiction over non-profit organizations left the symphony or-
chestra sector outside the scope of the Act.. In 1951, the Board spe-
cifically denied jurisdiction in the Philadelphia Orchestra case, 33 al-
though automatic jurisdiction existed over the Washington National Sym-
phony due to that orgainzation's location in the District of Columbia. When
the Rochester Philharmonic was experiencing serious labor problems in
1973 due to unfair labor practice charges, the Board reversed its position
and exerted jurisdiction over the major orchestras only. 34
Inclusion under the Act has been too recent to do more than affect the re-
maining closed shop agreements in several orchestras at this point. How-
ever, it is possible that unfair Abor practice charges may arise inmany
orchestras where discharge has been an issue in the past. Perhaps or-
chestras, now that they are covered by the Act, will follow the lead of the
rest of the private sector in adopting grievance arbitration by neutrals as
a standard procedure for use in discharge cases. On the other hand, the
standard practice of confidentially negotiating contracts above scale with
individual players might come under challenge. Under the dourt interpre-
tations of the Act in recent years, unions may demand detailed salary in-
formation on every employee in the bargaining unit; such a demand for in-
formation would destroy the confidentiality traditional in orchestras (of .
which more below). Also, one mey question whether the Board would look
favorably on the policy of paying individual players doing the same work
(i.e., all the viola players except the principal and his assistants) different
salaries based on subjective factors not capable of quantification. . Inclusion
under the Act may change the character of these traditional practices so
rapidly that the description of bargaining in this paper may soon become
obsolete. On the other hand, these changes will not take place unless a
majority of symphony players or management desire such a change, since
the Act is enforced through the filing of charges with the Board; if no
charges are filed, current practices could presumably go on indefinitely.
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Major Issues in Symphony Bargaining
The primary issue in bargaining has almost always been wages. 35 Union
security is almost never an issue, since the orchestras (exempt until 1973
from the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act) were not bound
by the legal restrictions on the closed shop and had long since bowed to
union strength in granting virtual hiring hall control on employment'in many
cities to local unions.
Symphony orchestra wages in the major orchestras are a function of two
dimensions.36 The first is the weekly base salary. The weekly base salary
sets a floor on wages for the whole orchestra. Individual players may bar-/
gain with.management for pay above this minimum. 37 The Personnel Mana-
ger, and sometimes the Librarian, are covered by the contract and the
former is frequently a member of the orchestra (and thus always of the
union); these individuals typically receive double scale as their base salary.
Players who double on more than one instrument or play solos receive ad-
ditional pay. Musicians who occupy special pe-itions of leadership (such
as- string section principals and wind players with frequent solo parts) may
negotiate well over scale. Years with the orchestra may be a factor, as well
as seating in some of the string sections. Also, given the scarcity of
qualified players in some positions (especially string players), some major
orchestras will bring new playersfrom other orchestras at competitive rates
above scale. 38 Estimates of the percentage of the orchestra which may
receive above scale weekly salaries range from 50 to 67%, although the
amount above scale is a figure which is usually jealously guarded by both
management and the- individual musician. 39 One source indicates that
salaries for concertmasters in major orchestras start at over $30, 000.40
Another indicates that solo woodwind players in the principal (i. e., Big
Five plus Los Angeles) majors may be more than double that, especially
if the, musician has developed an independent reputation as an international
virtuoso on his instrument. 41 Conductors' salaries are not covered by
the collective agreement, even though union rules require that only con-
ductors who are members of the union may appear with a union orchestra.
The second dimension of wages in the orchestra is the length of the season.
Since wages are negotiated as a weekly salary, the length of the season is
a crucial factor in determining the annual income a musician will receive
for his work. Before the change in bargaining in the late 1950's and early
1960's, major orchestra seasons tended to be about 25 weeks long, with no
paid vacations. 42 Thus, even if players were receiving a handsome weekly
salary, their annual orchestra income would be about half of that taken'home
by a year-round employee in industry earning the same weekly pay. Demands
for a lengthening of orchestral contracts in terms of weeks of contracted
employment are thus a major component of wage demands in orchestras.-
. That musicians have pursued this demand effectively is attested to by the
fact that a third of the major orchestras have achieved 52-week contracts,
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many with paid vacations of almost two months ( although this vacation pay
is at the negotiated minimum rather than the players' individual weekly
salaries in most cases). Almost half of the majors have virtual full-year
employment, with contracts covering at least as much of the year as the
usual teacher contract. 43
Other bargaining issues have included the conditions and rates for touring,
the length of rehearsals and concerts as well as their number in any given
week, procedures for removing players from their positions when the
Music Director indicates the desire for a change, procedures for termina-
ting employment, insurance,, and pensions. Some newer issues include
seating in string slections (giving each player a chance to sit near the front
on occaision), and some player input into artistic decisions. Two issues
that have seen tprnarounds due to militant bargaining on both sides of the
table have been moonlighting and splitting of the orchestra. . When seasons
were short and pay was low, moonlighting was an important component
of the symphony musician's income. (Indeed, in New York, there was
a long-standing joke that the taxi one took to hear the Philharmonic might
be driven by a member of the orchestra.) As seasons lengthened, however,
management began to ask for restrictions or prohibitions on moonlighting.
A major argument of management was that the musician, now employed
virtually fear-round and full-time, shduld give his full energies to music
so as to enhance his value to the orchestra. In addition, management
wanted to avoid having constantly tired moonlighting musicians showing up
for rehearsalk and concerts. By the mid-1960's, moonlighting clauses
appeared in many contracts; some prohibited moonlighting outright, some
required musicians to notify management of such activities, and others
required permission from management for specific engagements. 45 The
lengthening of seasons created another problem for orchestra management--
what to do with the musicians for whom they had contracted. Paid va-
cations were one method of lengthening the season without playing additional
concerts. But non-revenue producing vacations could not be extended in-
definitely as contracts neared the 5Z-week goal of the players. Extensions
of the regular symphony season (i. e., winter subscription series) were
considered impractical and too costly; as noted above, every concert by
the full orchestra in the regular hall loses money. One solution to this
problem was sometimes found by breaking the orchestra into smaller en-
sembles to accompany ballet, opera, or to appear in the schools. Since
some of this sort of activity might be paid for ator above cost by govern-
ment and other contracting irfstitutions, this type of employment could
solve two problems at once, providing employment for the musicians and
revenue for the orchestra. An innovative collective bargaining agreement
in Seattle, involving the symphony orchestra, the local union, and local
ballet and opera companies, provides the prime example of this sort of
arrangement. 46 Many orchestras have, in recent years, included in their
agreements clauses allowing management to break down the orchestra for
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special events. Local unions have frequently insisted, however, that free-
lance musicians must be protected by limiting the degree to which the
orchestra could break down.and compete directly with them. 47
PART II: SURVEY OF CONTEMPORARY ORCHESTRA BARGAINING
Survey Methodology
In order to ascertain the current state of collective bargaining agreements
and to compile more up-to-date data on strikes than was available from
secondary sources, the author undertook a direct mail survey of the major
orchestra managements and local unions in the thirty-one major orchestra
cities. The survey questions, included in the Appendix to this article,
asked about current terms of collective agreements, motivations and plans
of the parties, and strike activity during the past decade. In addition, the
author wrote to the American Symphony Orchestra League, an organization
composed of orchestra musicians, conductors, board members, management
officials, and concerned individuals, to enlist that organization's assistance.
The Symphony Orchestra League responded generously with several years
of back issues of the League's newsletter, Symphony News, from which some
of the 'data that follows was collected. Most of the data, however, come s
directly from the orchestras and unions themselves. An attempt to con-
tact ISCOM and acquire copies of "Senza Sordino" was unsuccessful.
Twelve of the thirty-one local unions responded, ei'ther by filling out the
questionnaire or returning a copy of theiT collective agreement. Nineteen
of the orchestra associations responded similarly. The general manager
of the Baltimore Symphony Orchestra directed the author's attention-to a
thesis written by Leon Lunden in 1967, which is the source for much of the
comparative data from a decade ago used in this article. Few of the re-
spondents answered all the questions on the survey form, although. all but
one answered enough to construct a picture of significant current contract
terms. Allowing for overlapping responses from unions and orchestras
in the same city, information ofi twenty-six of the thirty-one major or-
chestras was collected through the survey. Strike information on several
non-responding orchestras and financial information on the Detroit Sym-
phony, one of the non-respondents, was obtained from the Symphony News. 48
Information on the New Jersey Symphony, another non-respondent, was
obtained from a recent article on symphony strikes in Musical America. 49
Actual collective bargaining agreements were obtained from four of the major
orchestras, and they were interpreted, by the author as well as possible to
obtain information comparable to that given in survey question responses.
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Survey Results
The most striking data revealed by the survey pertains to wages and season
length. Lunden's data of a decade ago indicated only one orchestra paying a
minimum salary of more than $10, 000 annually; today, fifteen of the re -
sponding majors pay $10, 000 alf*more. In fact, all of the principal majors
pay a minimum above $15, 000, and eleven more orchestras pay over $10, 000.
Of the remainder, only onefajor orchestra could be characterized as offer-
ing only part-time pay to its employees, although three others pay much less
than what other white collar employees such as teachers and government
administrators receive for work requiring comparable training. The change
in seasonal length in ten years is also quite amazing. During the 1964-1965
season, two orchestras employed their musicians for 50 or more weeks. In
1973-1974, the number had jumped to twelve. At the other end of the spectrum,
twelve orchestras included in Lunden's survey offered less than thirty weeks,
and only six offer less than forty. 51
Other terms and conditions have changed drastically as well. For example,
in 1959, McCalley noted that only three major orchestras had pension plans,
and that life insurance, medical coverage, and paid vacations were ex-
tremely rare. 52 Lunden charted the development of these benefits into the
1960's. In 1960, Lunden found that ten major orchestras had pension 53
coverage of some variety. By 1965-1966, the number had grown to eighteen.
Twenty-four of the twenty-seven orchestras for which current data is avail-
able now have pension plans, and all but two of them are non-contributory
(i. e., the musicians do not contribute through payroll deductions to the
maintenance of the pension.fund.) Similarly, Lunden found that only four
major orchestras provided hospital insurance'in 1960. By 1963-1964, the
number had grown to nine, of which six were contributory plans. By 1965-
1966, there were twelve such plans, with the majority still contributory. 54
In the 1973-1974 survey, seventeen orchestras listed non-contributory
insurance schemes of some type. Two more had insurance plans which
were partially funded by management and partially by payroll deductions.
Six more had insurance plans which were entirely contributory. Thus,
twenty-five out of the twenty-seven from whom data was available now have
insurance of some sort for their musicians.
Perhaps the greatest benefit growth has come in terms of vacations, however.
When orchestras played short seasons, provisions for vacation were virtually
unthinkable. Not until 1955 did the first negotiated paid vacation occur, in
the New York Philharmonic. With the lengthening of seasons, vacations
began to appear in orchestra agreements, sometimes as one of the methods
of lengthening the contracted season. Lunden reported that twelve orchestras
had vacations, varying from one to five weeks, in the 1966-1967 season. 5 5
Twenty-three out of twenty-six orchestras providing data in the 1973-1974
survey had vacations with pay. Six of these orchestras had vacations of seven
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weeks duration, five had six-week vacations, and two had four -week
vacations.
One characteristic of orchestra agreements that has remained generally
stable is contract duration. Most orchestra agreements cover a period
of three years. Management prefers a multi-year contract, because,
in a period of increasing player militance, a longer pact guarantees peace
for a predictable period during which management can make commitments
for tours and recordings that might be expensive to break. During the
1965-1966 season, Lunden reports thatfifteen three-year contracts were
in effect, with four one-year contracts, and the remainder either two or
five years. 56 By 1973-1974, the five-year .contracts had disappeared.
One orchestra had a four-year agreement, eighteen had three-year agree-
ments, three agreements ran for two years, and three werpe.for one year.
About half of the agreements expire in the fall, or just prior to the be-
ginning of the orchestra's regular winter subscription season. The re-
mainder expire in the spring or during the summer. Only two contracts
presently in forc8 expire during the actual winter season of the orchestra.
As we shall see, the date of expiration has a relationship to orchestral
militance.
Summarizing this general description of benefits, it seems that the militant
decade of the 1960's has paid off in terms of financial and material gains
for the symphony musicians. Virtually all the major orchestras now pro-
vide year-round employment with paid vacations, benefit plans comparable
to other private sector employment, and reasonably good salaries.
In addition to these material benefits, musicians have made distinct gain?
on other fronts. In five orchestras, string players have won the institu-
tion of rotation seating, a plan under which every player in the string section,
regardless of seniority or subjectively-evaluated ability, has an oppor-
tunity to sit near the front of the section at some time during the season.
Nine orchestras reported special rates for touring and other out-of-town
engagements. In twelve orchestras, musicians may request personal
leave time without losing seniority. In four orchestras, the musicians have
negotiated the right to be consulted on the choice of a new Music Director,
and one of these clauses gives the orchestra in question what is virtual
veto power over the choice. Several orchestras have clauses under which
the orchestra members or a representative committee give advice to
management on the choice of guest artists and repertory.
On the other side of the fence, management has won the right to break
down the ensemble (usually with limitations on this right carefully defined)
in nineteen agreements. Lunden reported only eight such clauses in the
571966-1967 season. On moonlighting, however, the thirteen clauses re-
ported by Lunden in 1966 58 have shrunk to a mere handful reported in
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the current survey, although it appears that the wording of the survey
question may have screened out the reporting of various "permission"-
type clauses which come within Lunden's definition of a moonlighting
clause.
The material gains won by musicians during the 1960's are indeed im-
pressive in absolute terms. But they are even more impressive when
viewed in relative terms. Taking six orchestras for which comparative
data was available in the Lunden study, 59 the author has computed a
comparison of salary gains and increases in the cost of living (as'mea-
sured by the consumer price index for the six cities in question) 6 0 for
the period 1952-1974. Of the six major orchestras (three Big Fives
and three in the next lower category), all atleast tripled their annual
minimum negotiated salary during a period when the cost of living was
increasing by about half. One extremely militant orchestra, which has
had three strikes during the 19 6 0's, increased its salary by about 600%
during a period when the cost of living in its home city was increasing
by 45%. The figures for the three Big Five orchestras are less im-
pressive, but only because the 1952 base salaries from which percentages
are computed were higher in their cases. Absolute increases in salary
of about $13, 000 in these orchestras come but to percentage increases
of about 300%, while the cost of living was going up by about 53% in the
three cities, as compared to an absolute increase of about $11, 000 in
the remaining three orchestras with a CPI increase of about 47% com-
pared to a percentage salary increase of well over 450%. In brief,
orchestral salaries have risen far beyond the escalation in living costs,
although in absolute terms the musicians might justly contend that most
of the increase was in the nature of catch-up rather than real-gain pay,
since the 1952 base salaries were fantastically low (ranging from $1928
to $4270).
The Symphonic Strike Picture
Descriptions of the symphony orchestra business as a strike-prone in-
dustry would have been laughable in 1950, when there had been only two
strikes recorded in the entire history of American orchestras. 61 The
decade of the 1950's saw three more strikes, however, with two of them
occuring in Philadelphia, the home of the nation's most militant orchestra.
According to the author's survey results, the decade of the 1960's saw
at least seventeen more strikes; this may be an understatement, because
several major orchestras a/re not represented in the survey response and
data on their strike activity was acquired haphazardly through news reports.
In the three complete bargaining sessions and part of a fourth that have
elapsed thus far in the 1970's, there have already been at least twelve
strikes. With the bulk of the 1960's strikes occuring late in the decade,
the period 1964-1974 could justly be called the orchestras' Decade of
Militance.
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What is most significant about the stepped-up strike activityof the 1960's
and 1970's is not so much the numbers but the locations. The early
orchestra strikes came in the most prestigious ensembles, such as the
Philadelphia, Chicago and New York Orchestras. By themid-1960's,
however, strike activity had spread to the non-principal majors, such as
St. Louis, San Francisco, and Washington. By the late 1960's, there were
strikes in San Diego, Kansas City, Baltimore, Rochester, and Minnea-
polis. During the 1970's, the location of strike activity became completely
unpredictable on the basis of orchestra demographics. If the major orches-
tras are ranked in terms of salary, vacations, or any other benefit, strike
activity can be found at virtually any level of the rankings. One can no
longer say that the principal majors, where the greatest innovations and
gains are traditionally made, are the -most militant orchestras. Kansas
City experienced strikes in 1969 and 1973. Minnesota struck in 1970 and
1973. Cleveland struck in 1970, and the 1973 negotiations there stretched
on into the early months of 1974 until a last-minute deal was reached
after a strike vote had been taken. The possibility of a strike is now a
real factor in the negotiations of all but a handful of orchestras. Those
orchestraslwhich seem 1'strike-proof" probably include the Utah Sym-
phony in Salt Lake City, where Maestro Maurice Abravanel had induced
an atmosphere of exceptional cooperation with the Musicians Union. 62
Similarly, the bargaining atmosphere in Seattle remains highly collaborative,
and, as one might expect from the town's reputation, the Boston Sym-
phony remains the only Big Five orchestra where negotiations appear to
be invariably civil and friendly. (In fact, the Boston Symphony was the
only management respondent to reply to the survey through its personnel
manager, who is, of course, a member of the union!)
Indeed, the statements of orchestra management in response to a survey
question on which factors inguence their response to union demands il-
lustrates how the attitude of'management and players can affect the in-
cidence of strikes. In an orchestra which has had two strikes in the past
five years, management responds, in its own words, with "absolute firm-
ness--no sympathy." An extremely venerable orchestra which has never
had a strike responded that "while the terms of a contract always are im-
portant, the manner in which that contract is negotiated is of equal if not
greater importance. What is in our contract is less important. . .than the
relationship of orchestra/management we have worked hard to develop
over the years."
A much younger orchestra which has also been strike free seems to have
effectively elicited support and understanding for its financial problems
from the musicians: :We have a paradox (here). (The) orchestra has never
asked for (a) pay increase, but we give (one) regularly. Negotiations are
based on mutual trust and respect and mutual benefit. " The contract terms
in this orchestra place it in the middle of the non-principal majors.
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The manager of another orchestra which has not suffered a strike
claimed that his response to union demands was based on "understanding
musicians' real needs and ascertaining (their) real. demands." 'The
manager of an orchestra which suffered a bitter four-week strike in
its last round of negotiations replied that he "(did) not understand the
question. " There may be other factors than the expressed attitude of
management affecting the incidence of strikes. Another orchestra
which suffered atWo-week strike in its last negotiation reported that
it determines its response as follows: "Be fair and honest with them
concerning problems of fund raising -- dealing with them as people whom
we consider important. " By contrast, the manager of one ofo the most
militant orchestras of the 1860's responded in just four words: "Control"
and "Ability to Pay."
Wages appear to be a major cause of strikes, as well as the related issue
of season length. But orchestras that have achieved the 52-week contract
and professional (i. e., minimum scale of $15, 000 or more) salary levels
still strike over other demands. The recent New York Philharmonic strike,
for example, closed down the orchestra for ten week over the issues of money,
fringes, and rotation seating. A major factor in the dragged-out Cleveland
negotiations this year seemed to be major medical coverage, as. well as
the fact that'Cleveland's financial terms of employment were far out of
line with those of the other Big Five orchestras. (Cleveland also seems to
be one of the few major orchestra cities where the Local Union still retains
an active role in the bargaining process. )63
Non-monetary questions, such as the social status of symphony musicians
and theii position as artists in the orchestra, may be a major contributing'
factor to the question of strikes. Certainly, Arian's study of the Phila-
delphia Orchestra (which is the inside view of a one-time member of that
ensemble) suggests that symphony orchestra musicians are over-educated
for the jobs they perform and are consequently unhappy with their work. 64
Conductor Josef Krip's (formerly of the San Francisco Symphony) frequently
repeated comment thab' "an orchestra musician when he wakes up in the
morning is already offended, because he knows beforehand that he will be
abused by the conductor, by the management, by the board, by the press,
by everybody" 6 5 suggests that Arian's conclusions are applicable to more
than just the Philadelphia Orchestra case, despite denials by the American
Symphony Orchestra League. . Robert Evett supports Arian's conclusion
on financial grounds that the most militant players, and the core of the union
activists, are those whose relative obscurity in the orchestra not only leaves
them with the minimum negotiated salaries but also blocks their psychological
needs for ego-satisfaction once they have achieved material security. 67 For
these musicians, who by definition will make up the majority of any orchestra,
it is not enough that they have obtained professional status financially; the
attitude of management and the public may' be all-important in determining
their level of militance.
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Does the orchestra strike pay off for the musicians in the long run?
The author has attempted to answer Ajis question quantitatively in a
variety of ways without achieving a fully satisfactory answer. Using-
comparative data from Lunden's study and the 1973-1974 survey
results, averages and rankings in terms of season length, salaries,
and vacations were computed for orchestras which suffered no strikes
during the Decade of Militance, those with one reported strike during
that period, and those with two. Orchestras in the last group are
characterized as most militant, since this was the greatest number of
strikes reported by any orchestra for the period in question. The re-
sults of these computations were surprising. The greatest percentage
increases in salaries and seasonal length during the past decade came
in orchestras which experienced no strikes at all. However, the absolute
increase in dollars and weeks for those orchestras averaged less than
those of the striking orchestras. Orchestras which suffered only one
strike during the period ( and this group included several principal majors)
achieved the smallest percentage gain but the greatest absolute gain, re -
flecting the already-larger salary bases they had achieved by 1964. The
orchestras which had two strikes experienced a much larger gain in
percentage terms than those with only one, but still somewhat less than
those which had no strikes. The absolute increase in number of weeks
contracted for by agreements shows a reversal from absolute salary
increase figures; the most militant orchestras gained slightly more weeks
in an absolute sense than the less militant ones, and an average of one
week more than the non-militant ones, but in percentage terms the non-
militant orchestras led again. Percentage increases in terms of vaca-
tions could not be calculated due to the lack of comparative data, but the
length of vacations contracted for in 1973-1974 was greatest in the one-
strike orchestras and least (,an average of only 1.5 weeks) in the most
militant orchestras. This may reflect sorre gains made by the principal
majors before the decade in question.
Given this sort of data, and the interesting fact that the only contract term
or benefit which seems to relate highly to strike activity is the expiration
date of the'contract (most strikes occur in orchestras which bargain just
before the winter season begins), one is tempted to speculate that pattern
bargaining is occuring, with the striking orchestras breaking new ground
and the non-striking musicians picking up bigger gains in the following
round of bargaining. The most militant orchestras, a group whose salaries
and vacation terms are lowest of all on an aggregate, may be following a
completely separate trend that will be absorbed into the pattern when and
if their terms and conditions of employment are brought into line with the
orchestras in the other two groups.
If pattern bargaining affecting the first two groups is occuring, it might
show up it the strike data in terms of cycles of strikes. Unfortunately,
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most orchestras responding to the survey indicated the year a strike took
place without giving the actual dates. But even the yearly data indicates
that there is! some sort of cyclical activity in symphony strikes. The big
strike years of the past decade were 1966 (with the epochal Philadelphia
strike), 1969, and the most recent round of negotiations. In other words,
about every three years a wave of strikes hits the symphony world. This
reflects, of course, the prevalence of three-year contracts. But if the
off-years for strikes include bargaining for just as many orchestras as
the heavy strike years, that might indicate that a pattern is emerging.
Unfortunately, the data yielded by the survey is not conclusive on this point.
All of the existing contracts were negotiated in 1971, 1973, or 1973.
The year 1971 was an off-year for strikes. Only one out of the five or-
chestras reporting negotiations that year suffered a strike, and this or-
chestra was one of those that would be placed in'the most militant cate-
gory, which we have excluded from the pattern hypothesis. Of the 1972
bargaining orchestras, three out of ten suffered strikes, but two of those
strikes were in most militant orchestras. Four out of eleven 1973 bar-
gaining processes included strikes. In this case, only one of the striking
orchestras could be placed in the most militant category, but the financial
terms of this orchestra's agreement would tend to place it in the pattern
group. Thus, confirmation for the theory is by no means solid oi the basis
of survey strike data, but at least tenative confirmation may exist. Three
out of the four 1973 strikes took place in orchestras which are definitely
"leaders" in breaking new contract grounds, with issues such as rotation
seating included. (One of these, the archetypal leader, was the first or-
chestra throughthe years to negotiate a paid vacation, the first to actually
play under a 52-week contract, and the first to negotiate a $20, 000 base
scale, which will take effect during the final year of the new contract.)
Only one of the striking orchestras ended up with scale less than $10, 000,
and in fact, two of the three orchestras remaining are definite "wage .
leaders" in symphonic employment. By contrast, all of the remaining or-
chestras bargaining in 1973 could be characterized as followers, achieving
respectable increases and sometimes dramatic ones. In fact, two of these
"follower" orchestras achieved 52-week seasons (which are not characteristic
generally of orchestras in their financial neighborhood), whichmay indicate
a pattern effect. However,, a longer-term study with more data would be
required to draw a firm conclusion on this subject. As a tenative con-
clusion, one may state that the gains achieved during the decade of wide-
spread militance were so much greater than those attained during the period
of collaboration between local unions and orchestra associations that
strikes are probably due some credit for the gains.
In terms of confirming the pattern bargaining theory, a fascinating project
for further study might be to trace the appearance of some innovative clause
of the 19 6 0's through various contracts. Certainly, the fact that both sides
confer among themselves on contract terms (the musicians through ICSOM
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and management through the "Major Managers Group" in the Symphony
Orchestra League) lends credence to the pattern theory, but a detailed
study on one or two contract clauses would provide strong confirmation
for the theory.
The Orchestra Agreement: Its Terris and Peculiarities
On the basis of contract terms, one may discern four distinct groups among
the'major orchestras. Group A, consist ng of the Big Five plus Los Angeles,
includes 100-musician ensembles with 52-week seasons, 6-7 weeks of paid
vacation; and minimum scales ranging from $15, 600 to $18, 200. The or-
chestras in this group, with the exception of the Boston Symphony, have '1l
suffered one strike during the Decide of Militancy, and, with the further
exception of Glevelaxid, were the siters ofmost of those strikes occuring
before the decade. All of these orchestras have recording contracts with
major international labels, thus significantly raising the actual compensation
to musicians through royalties. (Indeed, one of these orchestras includes a
$2000/year royalty minimum guarantee in its collective bargaining agree.-
ment.) These are the nation's most prestigious and venerable symphony
orchestras. Two of these orchestras sent the author a copy of their
collective agreements.
Group B consists of eleven major orchestras in some of the nation's largest
cities. They are slightly smaller in terms of membership, and their salary
minima range from $10, 000 to $14, 535 for seasons running from 52 weeks
down to a low of 44. All but one of these orchestras have paid vacations,
ranging in length from one to seven weeks. In terms of orchestral militancy,
about one-third of these orchestras have never suffered a strike, one-third
had one strike duting the past decade, and one-third are in the most militant
group. All of these orchestras have made recordings at one time or another,
but none has a long-standing history as a major recording orchestra on a
major international label, with the possible excdption of the National Sym-
phony Orchestra in Washington; thus, royalties firomrecordings are not a
significant feature of the musician's remuneration. In the past, some of
these orchestras have made recordings of comtemporary repertory at re-
duced rates for minor labels with the acquiescenee of the A. F. M. These
orchestras tend to haver respectable regional reputations and attract
audiences on American tours, but their international reputations are not
quite as high as those of the Group A orchestras. Their conductors tend
to be somewhat less prestigious, and spend more time in the orchestra's
home city. One of these orchestras sent the author a copy of its collec-
tive agreement.
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Group C consists of eight orchestras, most of which are newer and
have less of a reputation outside their own regions. Their salaries
range from $6, 560 to $9, 690, for seasons varying from 32 to 42 weeks.
They all have paid vacations, lasting from one to three weeks. About
half of the orchestras in this group have never struck, while the other
half are almost all in the most militant group. In terms of the prestige
of their conductors and their recording commitments, these orchestras
reside at the bottom of the major orchestra list. Only one has had a
continuing relationship with a major label, and that ended many years
ago. The others have recorded occaisionally. One of these orchestras
sent the author a.contract.
Group D hy othetically consists of new arrivals in the major group that are
not yet set up financially as major permanent orchestras. Only one such
orchestra responded to the survey. It provides part-time employment for
a relatively small number of musicians, paying a scale of $2, 912 for a
season of less than thiry weeks. It has no paid vacations or. any other
fringe benefits to speak of, and has had two strikes during the Decade of
Militance.
In terms of the evolution of bargaining, the orchestras in Groups A and B
are furthest along the road to control by the Symphony musicians of the
union side of the table.
A comparison of contract terms and language in the four contracts sent to
the author, spanning as they do the three significant groups of permanent
major symphony orchestras, sheds light on some of the issues peculiar to
orchestras, as well as showing the relative industrial relations sophis-
tication of the orchestras in each group. Since the contracts were sub-
mitted in confidence, the orchestras may not be identified by name, but
they will be described. Orchestra 1 is a Big Five eastern orchestra with
a lucrative recording contract and a world-celebrated conductor. It has
toured overseas frequently and has engaged in collective bargaining siAce
its founding. It has enjoyed a reputation as a militant orchestra, although
it had only one strike during the past decade, and as a leader in securing
new benefits for musicians. Orchestra 2 is a western ensemble of more
recent celebrity, paying a scale comparable to the Big Five. Although its
current conductor is of international repute, he is relatively younger and
less well established in the symphony world than his colleague in Orchestra
1. In fact, throughout its history, Orchestra 2 has employed up-and-coming
conductors who went on to become international celebrities conducting other
orchestras. This orchestra has a strike record comparable to' Orchestra 1.
Orchestra 3 is an eastern ensemble directed by a young, foreign-born con-
ductor of considerable talent. It has toured extensively within the United
States, and has more than merely a regional reputation, although it has
not recorded extensively. It has experienced strike activity during the past
decade comparable to most militant orchestras. Orchestra 4 is located in
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a small inland city away from'the coastal population belt of the east. It
has beien connected with a noted music conservatory, and its music direc-
tors for many years have been more noted as pedagogues than as inter-
national celebrities. Due to its academic affiliations and the interests of
one of its conductors, this orchestra had a long relationship with a major
recording company, unusual for an orchestra of its size and financial sit-
uation. The orchestra has been very militant in recent years. Two
severe strikes during the Decade of Militance are reflected in the contract
provisions. All four contract are three-year agreements covering the
season 1972-1973 through 1974-1975.
In terms of union security, the contracts reflect the strength of local
musicians' unions and the lack of NLRB jurisdiction prior to 1973.
Surprisingly, Orchestra 1 has no union security clause. Orchestra 2
has a standard unign shop provision, requiring new musicians to join the
local union within thirty days of hiring and requiring all musicians to re-
main members in good standing for the length of the contract. Orchestra
3 has a closed shop, with all new musicians required to join the union be-
fore they can be formally hired. Orchestra 4's agreement includes a
rather vague formulation requiring all musicians to belong to the union,
without specifking when they must join. However,, after the NLRB's
jurisdictional ruling of 1973, an amendment to the agreement was concluded
containing specific union shop language, with a provisio stating: "In the
event that the current law concerning"closed shop' provisions is ever
changed so as to permit same, or if the NLRB changes its current policy
of exercising jurisdiction over symphony orches.tras, the former Para-
graph VII A shall be automatically reinstated into this agreement. " This
would indicate that the parties regarded their original clause as a closed
shop clause.
Three of the agreements 'specifiy the size of the orchestra. Orchestra 1
provides for 101 musicians (one serving as personnel manager) and a
librarian who is also to be a. member of the union. Orchestra 3 contracts
for the services of 92 full-time musicians, a librarian, and a personnel
manager .(who may be one of the 92) during the first year of the contract,
to increase to 94 in the third year. Orchestra 4 specifies a "core orches-
tra" of 55 full-time musicians. All four contracts set rates for the hiring
of additional musicians,. who must be union members.
All of the agreements have extensive language on touring conditions, speci-
fying the modes of transportation to be used, the quality of accomodations
to be provided,- and the number of concerts and rehersals that can be played
in a given unit of time while on tour. For example, Orchestra 4 forbids the
rehersal of anything but tour music once the orchestra is 55 miles or more
from its home base. Orchestra 1 agrees in its contract to excuse several
musicians from making a planned foreign tour because they are under
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medical advice not to fly and the orchestra had made commitments re-
quiring flying during the tour. Sim ilar details on specific touring con-
ditions appear in all the contracts.
Of particular interest in an artistic institution such as an orchestra is the
degree to which the musicians influence artistic decisions through col-
lective bargaining. Orchestra 2 provides, in its agreement, for the es-
tablishment of an Artistic Liason Committee, which compiles the opinions
of the musicians on such subjects as guest conductors,
guest soloists, and repertory. In addition, this Committee handles
grievances about the legibility of parts, which can be a major source of
complaint, particularly when an orchestra has a program of commission-
ing new works which are playedsfrom manuscripts or xerox copies of
handwritten parts. Orchestra 4, as a result of its conductor troubles
during the past decade, has a clause providing for close collaboration
between the management and the musicians in the choice of new Musical
Directors. Orchestra 4 also has -a continuous bargaining committee
which considers problems affecting the development of the orchestra
during the term of the contract. In addition, the contract forbids a merger
with a neighboring orchestra which had been rumored during the late
.1960's. Orchestra 4 also specifies the degree to which the orchestra can
be reduced in concert to play music requiring reduced forces. The
Addendum to the contract lists specific works which would be regarded
as representative of appropriate "symphonic" music calling for a re-
duction of forces. The examples reflect the repertory of the orchestra:
Wagner's Siegfried Idyll, Ravel's Tombeau de Couperin, Mozart's Eine
Kleine Nachtmusik, any Brandenburg Concerto of Bach, and Kurka's
Overture to Good Soldier Schweik. By contrast, neither Orchestra;l nor
Orchestra 3 have negotiated such artistic clauses. However, all of the
orchestra managements are curtailed in their programming decisions by
the time limitations on concert length specified in the collective agreements.
Orchestra 1 limits concerts as foll6ws:
The duration of any concert shall not exceed one hundred
thirty (130) minutes, starting from the time of call on the
bulletin board until the concertmaster leaves the stage at
the conclusion of the concert, withthe understanding that
the playing time during this period shall not exceed one
hundred five (105) minutes, and there shall be an inter-
mission of fifteen (15) minutes in each concert. Under
this agreement,, playing time is defined as follows: The
elapsed time from the conductor's first beat to the end of
the music before tntermission, plus-the elapsed time from
the conductor's first beat after intermission to the end of
the music at the conclusion of the concert. An additional
ten (10) minutes n.fplaying time (within the existing concert
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time) shall be allowed for two (2) programs of not more
than four (4) concerts each, said programs to be com-
prised of a single work, but said addition shall not be
allowed on tour weeks.
The last sentence undoubtedly refers to performances of works like the
monumental Mahler symphonies which have become very popular in re-
cent years and which frequently run close to two hours. The agreement
effectively prevents management from scheduling concert programs of
most complete operas, which were quite frequent in this particular city
for many years as itLacked a top rank opera company. Elsewhere in the
agreement, provision is made for the installation of a clock and the pre -
sehce of a timekeeper at all concerts to make sure the agreement is
lived up to. Orchestra 2 gives more leeway to the conductoi for pro-
gramming longer works. Concerts may go up to 2. 25 hours in duration,
with no specified length of playing time or intermission time. Extensions
of this time are authorized up to. 2. 50 or even 2.75 hours for the perfor-
mance of certain works at certain times of the year. While not speci-
fically regulating concbrt length, Orchestra 3 requires a 15-minute inter-
mission in all concerts running over 90 minutes, and a 20-minute inter-
mission between "back-to-back" Youth Concerts. Also, Orchestra 3,
by definng a service as 150 minutes and limiting services without over-
time to two in a given day, effectively limits the number of concerts that
might last longer than a service. The agreement also provides: "Musicians
shall not be entitled to overtime pay -when required to remain in their seats
for bows during applause after the performance has ended." Orchestra 2
has a similar clause. Orchestra 4 provides a formula based on the size
of the orchestra, implying that the larger the orchestra is, the less wear
is felt by the individual player. (This may be debatable, considering the
nature of some works requiring an enlarged ensemble.) At any rate, when
the orchestra includes 5 extra musicians, the concert'may run P. 25 hours,
When the number of extra people:is less,- or just the "co-rd orchestra" is
performing, concerts may run only two hours, but management may
schedule three programs during the season using these reduced forces
for 2. 25 h6urs. The concert programs during which opera or ballet are
performed may run three hours. "Program material must be arranged
within this time limit with enough leeway for applause or other emergencies
such as resetting stage,. etc. This time limit applies to all concerts whether
or not a soloist or special feature is included."
Dividing the orchestra is a frequent subject for coverage. Orchestra 4
may be divided into units of 15 or more players during any week of the
season, with various requirements as to consulting the musicians in-
v9lved and spreading around extra work equitably. Management is more
restricted in Orchestra 3, as it can break down the orchestra into units
no smaller than 25 and must distribute principal players among the seg-
ments equally. Orchestra 2 has the same size limitations as Orchestra 3,
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but the contract further limits management's flexibility by limiting the
number of accasions on which division can take place, and by providing
principal position pay for those members of the segment that are assigned
principal positions within the reduced unit, which they do not ordinarily
fill in the full orchestra. Orchestra 1 has a much less specific clause,
limiting breakdown to two units, which may or may not be equal in size to
half the orchestra. The number of occaisions on which breakdown may
occur, however, is strictly limited, and type of concert so allowed is
limited to free educational programs.
Among the outstanding features of health and pension benefits are pro-
visions for musicians joining Health Maintenance Organizations in Or-
chestra a contract and provisions for benefit-concerts insome other
agreeme s. All four orchestras have pension and insurance plans.
A point of major contention in these orchestras has been the procedure for
the dismissal of players. Retirement is mandatory at age 65 in Orchestra
1; Orchestra 4 makes retirement possible at 65, but musicians may con-
tinue to play in the orchestra by joint agreement; Orchestra 3 mandates
iretirement at 70; Orchestra 2's contract is obscure on the point. Dis-
missal is for just cause in all of the orchestras, although suitable grounds
are specified differently in the different contracts. Some of these contracts
require a disputed discharge to go through a grievance committee. Some
provide binding arbitration, while others specify an internal appeals
process which is final but which includes participation in the decision by
members of the orchestra. Discharge is a controversial subject in or-
chestras, because the evaluation of musical ability is a very subjective
process. Before the current strengthening of contract terms, conductors
had virtual "life or death" power over musicians at any time. Discharge
clauses were consequently among the first goals of musicians when they
gained control from the local unions over the bargaining process, and un-
popular discharge decisions by management have been the specific cause
of several strikes and the institution of NLRB proceedings in the landmark
Rochester. Philharmonic case that brought orchestras under the Board's '
jurisdiction. Most orchestra contracts have clauses governing discharge,
but the degree to which a player of declining ability can hang on varies
from one organization to another.
Among those contract clauses about which data was not available generally
but would be interesting in a future study are the following: availability of
arbitration in grievances, degree of pension and insurance coverage, com-
prehensiveness of touring provisions, degree of participation in bargaining
by the local union. Unfortunately, at the time the present survey was
drawAlup, the author had no existing orchestra contracts available to refer to
in framing the questions, so these and other interesting areas were
onitted from the questioning.
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In sum, orchestra contracts combine features common to most in-
dustrial collective agreements with features unique to orchestras.
Peer review on dismissals and musician input' into artistic policy are
examples of argas where symphony orchestras are unique and may pro-
vide insights into the shape of similar clauses in future white collar
bargaining. Union security, pensions, and other financial benefits are
examples of areas where the symphony players-have secured contract
coverage similar to that in other occupations covered by collective
bargaining agreements.
Conclusions
The collective bargaining process has changed drastically in the major
symphony orchestras over the past two decades. Players who were poorly
represented at the beginning of that time have won direct and forceful
representation for themselves. The results in terms of.contract terms
have been tremendous. Salaries, season length, benefits, and non-eco-
nomic issues have all shown tremendous change for the betterment of the
players over the past two decades. The Decade of Militance, stretching
from about 1964 to the present, has shown a doubling of salaries as most
of the major orchestras have expanded to near full-year employment with
paid vacationk. Clearly, the difference between the old condition and the
new has been the degree of direct input from the symphony musicians.
At the same time, one must observe that these financial gains, although
perhaps merited by the musicians who had been subsidizing the orches-
tras by playing at the old, low rates. have seriously threatened the
existence of the orchestras. The cost of running a major orchestra in-
creased so dramatically during the Decade of Militance that the American
Symphony Orchestra League's definition 6f a major orchestra in terms
of budgetary expenditures had to be revised upwards substantially in
recent years to feflect reality. The Income Gap, of course, rises with
the budget, since income from ticket sales and recording royalties
increases, if at all, at a slower rate than salaries.
At the outset, we said that the case of the symphony musician can-be especi-
ally instructive in a period when collective bargaining is expanding to white
collar employees with professional training. Several lessons can be learned
from the symphony experience. One is that the workers themselves must
be involved and have sole ratification rights if they are to achieve reasons
able terms and conditions of employment, particularly when they work for
nonprofit organizations that convince a local union on the ability-to-pay
argument, such as voluntary hospitals, for example. Another lesson is
that management must approach such workers with a special mental set it
it is to avoid militance in the relationship. One of the leading orchestras,
with a magnificent contract in terms of salary, vacation,.medical and pension
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coverage, arbitration of disputes, etc. , is still one of the most militant
of all ensembles, because the players have perceived management's at-
titude ashostile or at least denigrative of their artistic standing.
Some of the most successful orchestral collective bargaining relationships
have emerged in cities where the management treats the musicians as
artists worthy of being consulted on the fate and policy of their orchestra,
as partners in an artistic endeavor. This lesson might easily be extended
to professional employees generally. If management deals with them as
"hirdd help, " they will behave like hired help and strike even when striking
might endanger the existence of the enterprise. If management can involve
the employees in the fate of the organization by treating them as equally-
concerned partners worthy of consultation on important decisions (i. e.,
meaningful rather than pro forma consultation), militance might be avoided,
even when financial rewards are not so munificent. (See, for example,
the case of the Utah Symphony Orchestra. ) As an example of what can
happen when management is not sincere in offering consultation rights,
consider the Cleveland Orchestra case. 68 When George Szell, Cleveland's
Musical Director, died after a quarter-century with the orchestra, manage-
ment told the players that they would have a say in the choice of a successor.
After a season of guest conductors, the players were polled as to their
preference. The conductor who came in last in the poll was offered the
position, and the musicians were extremely upset. According to one report,
as many as thirty-seven of the orchestra's members tendered their res-
ignations. (It is not known how many actually left the orchestra over this
incident.) Residual bitterness over this episode may have been at the heart of
the prolonged 1973-1974 negotiations, which ended at the last moment before
a voted.strike was to take place. The militancy record of such cities as Phila-
delphia and Boston attest to the further truth of this lesson. The Philadelphia
musicians, as described by Arian, 69 were disenchanted by inanagement's
attitude so completely that not ev~n the distinction of being the first orchestra
to win a 52-week contract commitment could keep them from a long and bitter
strike in the following round of negotiations, In Boston, by contrast, despite
the turbulent history of that orchestra in the 1940's, there has been no strike
and the musicians appear to have been satisfied with the appointment of
their new Music Director last year.
Perhaps some of the distinguishing characteristics of major orchestra collec-
tive bargaining make the setting so unique that no valid comparisons can be
drawn. The author, however, feels that the lessons enumerated above might
apply with profit to loosely comparable situations in other areas of employ.-
ment. Symphony musicians have won much through collective bargaining in the
past two decades. Only the future can tell whether they will continue to gain
increases at the present rate in the face of the spreading Income Gap and the
frequently predicted financial and artistic collapse of the orchestra as an
American institution.
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Local Union Questionnaire included the folowing:
1. Do you have a collective bargaining agreement presently in force?
2. What is the 4uration of the present agreement?
What is its expiration date?
3. What new clauses that you consider important were included in the
present contract and were not included in the contract before that one?
What was the minimum scale in the present contract?
What was the length of the season (in weeks) in that contract?
4. Which of the following are included in the present contract: pension
(contributory; noncontributory), leave-time during season, vacations
(how many weeks),, health insurance or life insurance (contributory;
noncontributory),I rohibition on moonlighting in other ensembles
of specified size, special tour rates or tour overtime, management
option to break down into smaller ensembles for special events,
musicians participate in selection of musical director, musicians
participate in choice of repertory, musicians participate in choice
of guest artists, rotation in section seating.
5. Of those items not checked above, which were sought unsuccessfully
in the most recent contract negotiations?
What other significant new clauses were sought?
6. Of those items not checked kbove, which will you seek in the next
round of contract negotiations ?
7. What other major new clauses can you now see as possible objec-
tives in future negotiations?
8. Do you make comparisons to other orchestras in setting contract
goals? Which orchestras do you look to?
Do you make comparisons to other professions? Which?
9. Have you conducted a strike in the past ten years?
When and for how long? Which of the goals mentioned above or not
mentioned thus far were the causes of the strike(s)?
10. If you believe that there are any special features of the collective
bargaining agreement in force for your orchestra which deserve
special mention, could you describe them briefly?
Orchestra Association Questionnaire included the above with the exception
of question eight, for which the following was substituted:
8. What factor(s) do you consider most significant in determining how to
respond to the local union's demands?
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Major American Orchestra Strikes
Year City Length*
1922 Chicago N.A.
1941 Detroit. 1 day
1954 Philadelphia 7 days
1958 Los Angeles I day
1959 Philadelphia 10
1961 New York 7
Philadelphia 19
1963 Los Angeles 20
Washington 15
1964 WashingtoA 35
Saint Louis 42
1965 Indianapolis 17
1966 Philadelphia 58
Los Angeles 21
1967 San Francisco 49
Saint Louis 21
1968 San Diego 14
1969 Detroit N. A.
Washington 42
Kansas City 4Z
Baltimore N. A.
Rochester 35
1970 Minnesota N. A.
Cleveland N. A.
1971 San Diego 1
1972 Baltimore N.A.
Cincinnati 35
Indianapolis 63
Rochester 49
1973 Denver 14
Chicago 28
Kansas City 4
New York 70
Minnesota N. A.
*Lunden's data (pre-1966) was expressed in days. I have multiplied
data given to me in weeks by 7 to get comparable figures. This table
is not presented as complete, for reasons given in the text.
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